Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs by Morita, Hodaka & Waldman, Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Competition, Monopoly Maintenance,
and Consumer Switching Costs
Hodaka Morita and Michael Waldman
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
November 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1426/
MPRA Paper No. 1426, posted 11 January 2007
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITION, MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE,  
 
AND CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTS 
 
by 
 
Hodaka Morita 
School of Economics 
University of New South Wales 
Sydney 2052, Australia 
(61-2) 9385-3341, h.morita@unsw.edu.au  
 
and  
 
Michael Waldman 
Johnson Graduate School of Management 
Cornell University 
Sage Hall 
Ithaca, NY 14853 
(607) 255-8631, mw46@cornell.edu 
 
 
 
 
November 2006 
 
 
 
*We would like to thank Dennis Carlton, Michael Conlin, Joe Harrington, George Hay, Robert Masson, 
Yossi Spiegel, and seminar participants at the Australian National University, Cornell University, the 
Federal Trade Commission, UCLA, the University of Delaware, the University of Melbourne, the 
University of New South Wales, and the U.S. Justice Department for helpful comments.  We would also 
like to thank Jonathan Lim, Joe Podwol, and Kameshwari Shankar for research assistance. 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Significant attention has been paid to why a durable-goods producer with little or no market 
power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product.  This paper provides an 
explanation for this practice that is based on consumer switching costs and the choice of consumers 
between maintaining and replacing used units.  In our explanation, if a firm does not monopolize the 
maintenance market for its own product, then consumers sometimes maintain used units when it would be 
efficient for the units to be replaced.  In turn, the return to monopolizing the maintenance market is that 
the practice allows firms to avoid this inefficiency.  An interesting aspect of our analysis that has 
significant public-policy implications is that, in contrast to most previous explanations for why a durable-
goods producer with little or no market power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own 
product, in our explanation the practice increases rather than decreases both social welfare and consumer 
welfare.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In a number of court cases there have been allegations that various firms such as Kodak, British 
Leyland, and General Electric have monopolized the aftermarkets for their own products.1  A typical 
allegation is that the durable-goods producer monopolizes the maintenance aftermarket by refusing to sell 
spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers with the result that consumers of the firm’s products have 
no option but to purchase maintenance from the original durable-goods producer.  In this paper we 
explore an explanation for this practice that is based on consumer switching costs and the choice of 
consumers between maintaining and replacing used units.  In particular, we show that the practice can be 
used by firms to avoid an inefficiency concerning consumer maintenance decisions, where, in contrast to 
most previous analyses of the issue, in our analysis the practice increases both social welfare and 
consumer welfare.  This finding has important implications for public policy as elaborated upon below. 
 Much of the attention to this issue stems from the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case 
Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al.  Consistent with the above discussion, 
in that case Kodak was alleged to have monopolized the maintenance market for its copiers and 
micrographic equipment by refusing to sell spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that, even if Kodak had no market power in the market for new equipment, a 
potentially relevant antitrust concern was Kodak’s behavior in the maintenance market for its own 
products.  The Court thus concluded that Kodak’s alleged behavior of monopolizing the maintenance 
market for its own products by refusing to sell spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers was at 
least a potential antitrust violation.  This Court decision has significant implications for antitrust policy in 
aftermarkets and as a result has attracted substantial attention.    
 This paper investigates from a theoretical standpoint the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that, even 
when a firm has little or no market power in the market for new units, a firm’s behavior in the 
maintenance market can constitute an antitrust violation.  We consider an infinite-period competitive 
durable-goods model in which new consumers enter the market in each period and in which a unit of 
                                                     
1 These cases include the U.S. cases Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al., 1992, 
Service & Training Inc. v. Data General Corporation, 1992, PSI Repair Service, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 1997, 
United States of America v. General Electric Company, 1999, and SMS Systems Maintenance Services, Inc. v. 
Digital Equipment Corporation, 1999, as well as the U.K. cases British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. v. 
Armstrong Patents Company Ltd., 1986, and British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. v. T.I. Silencers Ltd., 1987, 
and the Hong Kong case Cannon Kabushiki Kaisha  v. Green Cartridge Company, 1999.  For a more complete list 
of U.S. cases see Elzinga and Mills (2001). 
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output potentially lasts two periods, where an important aspect of the model is that the required level of 
maintenance for a used unit is stochastic.  Our model incorporates two of the main features of the Kodak 
case and a number of other cases in which monopolizing the maintenance market has been alleged.  First, 
each durable-goods producer has the option of monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product.  
By this we mean that in each period, each durable-goods producer has the option of becoming the sole 
supplier of maintenance for its own new and used units of output.  Second, the market for new units is 
characterized by consumer switching costs.2  Due to switching costs, a firm that sells new units in period 
t has market power in subsequent periods when selling new units to those period-t purchasers.  An 
important focus of our analysis is to explore the ramifications of this market power on the efficiency of 
competitive maintenance markets.3     
 Analysis of this model yields a number of interesting findings.  First, if the maintenance market is 
competitive and durable-goods producers cannot commit to future prices for new units, then both social 
welfare and consumer welfare are below the levels achieved when commitment is possible.  The logic for 
this result is as follows.  If a firm could commit to future new-unit prices, then when selling a new unit to 
a new consumer in period t the firm would commit to sell replacement units in future periods to this 
consumer at marginal cost.  The reason is that this results in consumers making efficient choices 
                                                     
2 As indicated, a key component of our argument is the presence of consumer switching costs.  This is reasonable to 
the extent that the real-world cases we are trying to capture are characterized by substantial consumer switching 
costs.  A number of the cases, including the Kodak case, discuss the idea that consumers faced substantial switching 
costs.  For example, 
  “The system at CSC includes a combination of micrographics  
machines, and of computer hardware and software tailored specifically  
to CSC’s needs.  Trading its entire equipment for an “interbrand”  
competitor of Kodak, due to supra-competitive prices, it would be  
financially unfeasible for CSC.  The special software would have to be  
retailored at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars.  Data would  
have to be reformatted and operators would have to be retrained, again,  
at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars...” 
    (Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Eastman Kodak Co. v.   
Image Technical Services, Inc., et al. (1992), pp. 19-20) 
The allegations in the Kodak case also state that similar systems to the one described above were true for a variety 
of the firm’s customers such as “Blue Cross/Blue Shield, insurance companies, banks, and other large financial 
institutions in many states.” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et 
al. (1992), p. 19) 
 
3 There is an extensive literature that investigates models characterized by consumer switching costs.  However, the 
existing literature does not consider the idea that switching costs in a competitive durable-goods industry can affect 
the efficiency of maintenance decisions.  Papers in this literature include Klemperer (1987,1989) and Farrell and 
Shapiro (1988).   See Klemperer (1995) for a survey.  
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concerning whether to maintain or replace used units.  However, if firms lack the ability to commit, then 
due to the switching costs the firm extracts surplus in these later periods by charging prices for 
replacement units that are above marginal cost.  The result is that, since maintenance is priced 
competitively while prices for replacement units are above the competitive price, consumers in these later 
periods sometimes maintain used units when it would be efficient for the units to be replaced. 
Our second finding is that, if each durable-goods producer has the option of monopolizing the 
maintenance market for its own product, then each firm monopolizes the maintenance market in each 
period and in this way avoids the inefficiency described above, i.e., both social welfare and consumer 
welfare increase.  To see the logic for this result consider a durable-goods producer that monopolizes the 
maintenance market for its own product every period.  In each period, by optimally setting the prices for 
replacement units and the price schedule associated with different levels of maintenance, the firm extracts 
all the surplus from the consumers who purchased new units from the firm in the past (there is surplus 
both because of switching costs and because a used unit may require little maintenance).  In turn, since in 
each period the firm is extracting all of the surplus, the firm has an incentive to behave in a manner that 
maximizes that surplus.  The result is that consumers efficiently choose whether to maintain or replace 
used units, and, since in a competitive market it is the consumers who capture any increase in social 
welfare, there is a corresponding increase in both consumer and social welfare.   
In addition to the two main results discussed above, we also derive a number of other results of 
interest.  One such result concerns the role of no-trade clauses in maintenance contracts which is a 
common feature in many durable-goods markets.  In particular, in our analysis use of these no-trade 
clauses allow a firm to more effectively price discriminate by preventing the resale of new and used 
durable units.  We show that, in the presence of learning-by-doing in the production of durable units, this 
enhanced ability to price discriminate improves efficiency by increasing the number of new units 
produced at a low rather than high marginal cost of production.   
Other interesting results are found in two extensions of our basic analysis.  Our first extension 
considers why firms might prefer to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products rather 
than sign long-term contracts that specify the future prices for replacement units.  Here we show that, if 
we incorporate into the model the realistic enrichment that there is asymmetric information concerning an 
endogenous durability choice, then the resulting moral-hazard problem causes maintenance-market 
monopolization to be preferred over long-term contracting.  Our second extension considers why a firm 
4 
might prefer to monopolize the maintenance market for its own products by refusing to sell spare parts to 
alternative maintenance suppliers rather than simply raise the price for those spare parts.  Here we show 
that maintenance-market monopolization gives the firm more control over the price of maintenance with 
the result that monopolization is preferred because it is more effective at eliminating the maintenance 
versus replacement distortion. 
 Most previous researchers who have modeled a competitive durable-goods producer that 
monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product argue that the behavior reduces social welfare 
because it causes a standard deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing in the maintenance market (see the 
discussion in Section IV and earlier discussions in Shapiro (1995) and Chen, Ross, and Stanbury (1998)).  
Our analysis shows that there is another possibility for what happens when a competitive durable-goods 
producer monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product.  That is, the behavior can serve to 
eliminate a social-welfare distortion present in the maintenance market due to consumer switching costs.  
From a public-policy perspective this is a crucial difference because, if the main result of the behavior is 
the elimination of a social-welfare distortion present in the maintenance market, then the behavior will 
increase rather than decrease social welfare in which case the behavior should be allowed.  We discuss the 
public-policy implications of our analysis in detail in Section IV. 
Another interesting aspect of our analysis is that it shows that time inconsistency can be 
important in competitive durable-goods markets.  Building on the initial insights of Coase (1972) and 
Bulow (1982), earlier literature on durable-goods markets focuses on monopoly models.4  We show, 
however, that time inconsistency can also be important in competitive durable-goods settings when 
switching costs are important.  Further, in addition to showing that time inconsistency can be important in 
such settings, we also show that the ramifications of time inconsistency are quite different in these 
competitive settings.  That is, whereas time inconsistency hurts firm profitability in monopoly durable-
goods settings, it is the consumers rather than the producers who are hurt by time inconsistency in our 
competitive durable-goods analysis. 
 Our results build on insights found in earlier papers such as Schmalensee (1974), Su (1975), and 
Rust (1986).  Schmalensee, Su, and Rust consider durable-goods-monopoly settings in which the 
                                                     
4 Other papers in this literature include Bulow (1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), Butz (1990), Waldman 
(1993), and Karp and Perloff (1996).  For a survey of durable-goods theory that discusses this literature see 
Waldman (2003). 
5 
maintenance market is competitive.  They show that, because the durable-goods monopolist employs 
above marginal-cost pricing, consumers sometimes maintain used units when it would be efficient for the 
consumers to purchase new units.  Our analysis first shows that this earlier result of Schmalensee, Su, and 
Rust extends to a setting in which the market for new units is perfectly competitive and there are 
consumer switching costs that create market power at the date a consumer chooses whether to maintain or 
replace a used unit.  This market power induces consumers to sometimes make inefficient choices 
concerning whether to maintain or replace used units.  A fundamentally new insight of our analysis is our 
demonstration that, as discussed above, this inefficiency can be avoided by allowing competitive durable-
goods producers to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products, where both social 
welfare and consumer welfare increase as a consequence.5
 The outline for the paper is as follows.  Section II demonstrates our basic result that 
monopolizing the maintenance market can be employed in a competitive durable-goods setting to avoid a 
distortion concerning the maintenance versus replacement decision.  Section III investigates the 
robustness of our results to two extensions of our basic model.  The first introduces the possibility of 
long-term contracts that specify future prices for new durable units, while the second asks whether raising 
the price for spare parts can be used as a substitute for monopolizing the maintenance market.  Section IV 
first compares and contrasts our explanation for maintenance-market monopolization with alternative 
explanations found in the literature and then discusses the antitrust implications of our analysis.  Section 
V provides concluding remarks.          
  
II. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE AND CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTS 
 In this section we demonstrate our main result that, in the presence of consumer switching costs, a 
competitive durable-goods producer can avoid inefficient consumer behavior by monopolizing the 
                                                     
5 Our paper is also related to an analysis that appears in Carlton and Waldman (2006).  That paper focuses on the 
idea that competitive aftermarkets are not always efficient, where one of the cases analyzed is the same basic setting 
analyzed here.  However, we analyze this setting in much more detail than do Carlton and Waldman.  For example, 
they consider a two-period setting while we consider an infinite-period setting with overlapping generations of 
consumers.  This allows us to address the role of no-trade clauses in maintenance contracts which, as indicated, is an 
important feature of real-world durable-goods markets.  Also, we show that by incorporating endogenous durability 
choice maintenance-market monopolization can be preferred to long-term contracting, and we further show why 
maintenance-market monopolization can be preferred to raising the price for spare parts.  See also Tirole’s (1988) 
textbook for a reader exercise in which a durable-goods monopolist increases its profits by monopolizing the 
maintenance market because the monopolization avoids the Schmalensee, Su, and Rust distortion.  
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maintenance market for its own product.  We also show the role of no-trade clauses in maintenance 
contracts in achieving efficient outcomes.  In the next section we explore the robustness of our analysis 
by considering two extensions. 
 
A) The Model
 We consider an infinite-period model in which there are two perfectly-competitive industries, 
where one produces a durable good that lasts two periods while the other supplies maintenance for this 
good.  A newly produced unit is referred to as a new unit while one that is one period old is referred to as 
used.  We further assume a simple type of learning-by-doing on the part of durable-goods producers.  
Each durable-goods producer has a constant marginal cost of production equal to c and no fixed costs in 
any period for which the firm produced a strictly positive amount of output in the past, while marginal 
cost equals c′, c′>c, if this is the first period with positive production.  Further, to simplify the statement 
of the results we consider the nature of equilibrium in the limit as c′ approaches c from above.  
Incorporating the learning-by-doing assumption rules out as equilibria outcomes that have the unrealistic 
feature that each cohort of consumers purchases durable units from a different set of durable-goods 
producers.  We discuss this in detail at the end of the next subsection. 
 We now turn to our assumptions concerning maintenance.  A new unit of output requires a fixed 
amount of maintenance that we denote mN, mN>0, while the amount of maintenance required by a used 
unit, denoted mU, is stochastic and is described further below.  We also assume that new and used units 
are perfect substitutes as long as they each receive at least the required level of maintenance.  Further, a 
unit, either new or used, that receives less than the required level of maintenance cannot be used for 
consumption and has a scrap value equal to zero. 
 The level of maintenance required by a used durable unit produced by any firm j is the realization 
of a random draw from the probability density function f(.), where f(mU)>0 for all mU∈(0,∞).6  We also 
assume that the realization of mU for any specific used unit is privately observed by the individual who 
consumed the unit when it was new, where mitU denotes the level of maintenance required  
                                                     
6 We also assume f(.) is such that when the maintenance market is competitive and firms cannot commit to future 
prices, there is a unique price for a new unit that replaces a used unit that maximizes the present discounted value of 
future profits.  Note, this assumption is not crucial but serves to simplify both the statements of the propositions and 
the proofs.  
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in period t by the used unit consumed as new in period t-1 by individual i.7  By making the realistic 
assumption that the required level of maintenance is stochastic, we capture the idea discussed above that 
when replacement units are priced above marginal cost an inefficiency arises in which too many used 
units are maintained rather than replaced. 
 Maintenance for a durable unit produced by firm j can be supplied either by a firm in the 
perfectly-competitive maintenance industry or by firm j itself, where each type of firm has no fixed costs 
of supplying maintenance while the variable costs of supplying maintenance of level m equal m.  Note, 
since the maintenance industry is perfectly competitive, firms in this industry are willing to sell 
maintenance of level m at a price equal to m.  We allow for two possibilities concerning the maintenance 
market.  We first assume that each durable-goods producer cannot stop consumers of the firm’s product 
from purchasing maintenance from firms in the competitive maintenance industry.  We then assume that 
each durable-goods producer can stop consumers of its product from purchasing maintenance from 
competitive maintenance sellers and in this way monopolize the maintenance market for its own product.  
Although at this point we are not specific concerning exactly how this aftermarket monopolization is 
achieved, our reading of the literature is that in most real-world cases this is achieved by the durable-
goods seller refusing to sell proprietary parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  We come back to this 
issue in Section III.B.   
A related assumption is that when a durable-goods producer sells maintenance for its own product 
we assume it has the option of including a no-trade clause in the sale.  The no-trade clause means that a 
consumer who purchases maintenance from a firm cannot sell the maintenance to another consumer on 
the secondhand market.  As indicated earlier, such no-trade clauses are common in real-world 
maintenance markets.  In the photocopier market, for example, Xerox maintenance contracts are in 
                                                     
7 One way to justify mitU being privately observed by consumer i is by assuming that mitU is a function of the 
number and severity of the machine’s random malfunctions when it was new, and the only individual who has direct 
knowledge of this is consumer i.  In this interpretation the stochastic variable is the number and severity of 
malfunctions when the unit was new.  In the presence of asymmetric information concerning mitU, a durable-goods 
producer cannot make the replacement-unit price it offers a consumer contingent on the consumer’s realization for 
mitU, and this, in turn, limits a durable-goods producer’s ability to price discriminate if it does not monopolize the 
maintenance market for its own product.  Note, the alternative assumption that a unit’s original producer acquires 
some knowledge concerning the realization of mitU but less precise information than consumer i would not change 
the qualitative nature of the results.  Also, the assumption that mitU can be observed precisely by the unit’s original 
producer when that producer monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product would also not change the 
qualitative nature of the results. 
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general not transferable.  This is also true for Business Methods Inc. which is an authorized dealer of 
Toshiba copiers.8
 If durable-goods producer j does not monopolize the maintenance market for its own product in 
either period t-1 or t, then it can charge two prices for new units in period t.  Pjt1C denotes the price the 
firm charges consumers who do not trade in a used unit produced by firm j, while Pjt2C denotes the price 
the firm charges consumers who trade-in a used unit produced by firm j.  In both cases the superscript C 
refers to the fact the maintenance market is competitive.9  Also, we restrict Pjt2C to be less than or equal to 
Pjt1C  since, if Pjt2C>Pjt1C, the firm would sell no units at Pjt2C because consumers with used units produced 
by firm j would always choose to purchase at the no-trade-in price Pjt1C.     
In contrast, suppose durable-goods producer j monopolizes the maintenance market for its own 
product both in t-1 and t, and in each period it includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance.  This 
allows the firm to charge the following three prices for new units in period t.  Pjt1M denotes the price the 
firm charges consumers who did not consume a unit of the firm’s product in the previous period.  Pjt2M 
denotes the price the firm charges consumers who consumed one of the firm’s new units in the previous 
period.  Pjt3M denotes the price the firm charges consumers who consumed one of the firm’s used units in 
the previous period.  In all three cases the superscript M refers to the fact the maintenance market is 
monopolized.  In other words, the difference between this case and the previous one is that here a firm 
can price discriminate between an individual who consumed one of the firm’s used units in the previous 
                                                     
8 We also attempted to find out this information for Kodak, but were unable to acquire the information from a 
Kodak representative.  Besides the fact that they are common in practice, the reason we feel it is realistic to assume 
a durable-goods producer can include no-trade clauses when it sells maintenance is that maintenance consists of 
servicing a durable unit at regular intervals and when the unit malfunctions.  In other words, for the case of 
maintenance no-trade clauses are feasible since they are easy to monitor and enforce.  In contrast, we feel it is not 
realistic to allow no-trade clauses when a firm sells a durable unit (in particular, when it sells the unit in the absence 
of monopolizing the maintenance market) because monitoring and enforcing a no-trade clause in that case would be 
quite difficult. 
 
9 To be precise, the firm can theoretically price discriminate across three groups of consumers in this case, i.e., 
consumers who do not trade-in used units produced by firm j, consumers who trade-in functional used units 
produced by firm j, i.e., one-period-old used units, and consumers who trade-in non-functional used units produced 
by firm j, i.e., two-period or older used units.  However, what happens in equilibrium is that the firm would like to 
charge the lowest price to the consumers who do not own either type of used unit at the beginning of a period, but 
incentive compatibility yields that the firm cannot charge a lower price to this group, i.e., if it did, all three groups 
would purchase at this lower price.  The result, in turn, is that restricting the firm to only offer the two prices that we 
posit is equivalent to allowing the firm to offer three prices.  Note also that we could allow the firm to charge 
different prices to customers who trade-in a used unit produced by a different firm, but this would also not change 
the results. 
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period and an individual who in the previous period did not consume either a new or used unit of the 
firm’s output.   
The reason monopolizing the maintenance market with no-trade clauses included in its sales of 
maintenance allows firms to price discriminate across these three groups is as follows.  On the one hand, 
the firm can identify who is in which group in period t because it monopolized the maintenance market in 
period t-1 and through the act of providing maintenance directly observed who is in which group.  On the 
other hand, the firm can prevent resale of its new durable units across these three groups by only selling 
maintenance to purchasers of new durable units and individuals who own the firm’s used units.  This 
prevents resale of the firm’s new durable units because the firm is the sole provider of maintenance for 
these units, the maintenance is non-transferable, and the units are worthless without maintenance.10
 On the demand side, we assume that in each period t, t=1,2,...∞, a continuum of nonatomic 
consumers whose total mass equals nt, nt>0, is born and lives forever, where 1t
∞
=∑ nt<∞.  We say that a 
consumer who was born in period t is of age t′-t+1 in period t′, t′≥t.  We further assume that consumers 
are heterogeneous in terms of their basic valuations for the durable product and that there are consumer 
switching costs.11  The specification for consumer utility in the period a consumer is born is simple.  In 
particular, in the period in which he or she is born, each consumer i receives a gross benefit equal to vi 
from consuming a new durable unit produced by any of the durable-goods producers that receives at least 
mN units of maintenance.  Further, the distribution of vis in the cohort of consumers born in any period t is 
described by a density function ht(v)=ntg(v), where g(v)>0 for all (0,V], g(v)=0 for all v outside of this 
interval, and V>c+mN.  Note that in the analysis that follows it does not matter whether each individual i’s 
value for vi is privately known by individual i or publicly observable. 
 The specification for consumer utility in subsequent periods is more complicated because it  
                                                     
10 If the firm monopolizes the maintenance market in periods t-1 and t but does not include a no-trade clause in its 
period-t sales of maintenance, then the firm can identify the three groups in period t but cannot prevent resale across 
the three groups.  
 
11 As discussed by Klemperer (1995), there are a number of factors that can lead to the presence of consumer 
switching costs.  One possibility that nicely fits our model is that there is a cost associated with learning how to 
operate any particular producer’s product.  That is, each product is somewhat idiosyncratic concerning the specifics 
of its operation, and as a result a consumer bears a learning cost in the first period he or she uses a particular 
producer’s product.  The result is that in the first period a consumer is in the market he or she will bear this cost 
independent of which product he or she consumes.  However, the consumer can avoid the cost in all later periods by 
always consuming a unit produced by the same firm that produced the unit he or she consumed in the first period. 
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captures the switching costs.  Let Δ, Δ>0, denote the size of the switching costs and let firm jit be the 
producer of the durable unit that was consumed by individual i in period t.  Given this, consider consumer 
i born in period t and a period t′, t′>t.  The consumer receives a gross benefit equal to vi+Δ from 
consuming either a new or a used durable unit produced by firm jit′-1 and the required level of 
maintenance.  On the other hand, the consumer receives a gross benefit equal to vi from consuming a new 
or a used unit produced by a firm other than jit′-1 and the required level of maintenance.  If consumer i did 
not consume a durable unit in the previous period, then the consumer receives a gross benefit equal to vi 
from consuming a new or a used unit produced by any manufacturer and the required level of 
maintenance.  It is also assumed that all firms and all consumers are risk neutral and have a discount 
factor β, 0<β<1. 
 The timing of events is as follows.  Each period consists of four stages.  First, when 
monopolizing the maintenance market is an option, each durable-goods producer decides whether in that 
period to allow competition or monopolize the maintenance market for its own product.  Further, if a firm 
monopolizes the maintenance market, it decides whether to include a no-trade clause in its sales of 
maintenance.12  Second, each durable-goods producer chooses the prices for new units of output.  At the 
same time, each durable-goods producer that has chosen to monopolize the maintenance market chooses 
how much to charge for mN units of maintenance to individuals who purchase new units of its output, and 
a price schedule that specifies a price for each level of used-unit maintenance in the interval (0,∞).  We 
also assume all prices are non-negative.  Third, each consumer makes his or her purchase decisions.  
Fourth, a secondhand market opens up in which prices equate supply and demand.  Note that in 
equilibrium there is never trade on the secondhand market, but introducing the secondhand market allows 
us to show the role played by no-trade clauses in sales of maintenance.   
 Finally, to simplify the analysis, we focus on equilibria in which contracting and trading options 
are stationary, i.e., equilibria in which each firm offers the same set of contracts in each period and in 
which each market price is invariant to time, except we allow Pjt1C to have different values before and 
after a firm first sells new units.  Furthermore, to simplify the exposition, we eliminate from consideration 
                                                     
12 An alternative assumption that would yield the same overall results is that, in a period in which a firm first sells 
new units, the firm has the option of committing to monopolize the maintenance market and include a no-trade 
clause in its sales of maintenance in all subsequent periods.  Also, when a firm includes a no-trade clause in its sales 
of maintenance in period t, we also assume the firm can choose to only sell maintenance in period t to consumers 
who purchased new durable units from the firm in either period t or t-1.  
 
11 
equilibria in which firms offer terms that will not be accepted and incorporate an ε transaction cost 
associated with trading on the secondhand market (this last assumption rules out equilibria characterized 
by trades on the secondhand market that do not strictly improve welfare). 
 
B) Analysis
 The outline for this section is as follows.  First, we discuss the results of a benchmark  
analysis in which the maintenance market is competitive and each durable-goods producer can commit in 
the first period to the prices it will charge in subsequent periods for a new unit of output.  Second, we 
show that inefficiencies arise when commitment is not possible and durable-goods producers do not have 
the option of monopolizing the maintenance market for their own products.  Third, we show that 
monopolizing the maintenance market allows firms to avoid these inefficiencies with the result that both 
social welfare and consumer welfare increase. 
 Suppose the maintenance market is competitive and each durable-goods producer can commit in 
the first period to the prices it will charge in subsequent periods for a new unit of output.  Let Pjt1* denote 
the price that producer j charges in this case for a new unit of output in period t to consumers without a 
trade-in, while Pjt2* denotes the price that producer j charges for a new unit of output in period t to 
consumers who trade-in a used unit produced by firm j.  There exist values vL*, 0<vL*<V, and m*, 
0<m*<∞, such that the following describes the equilibrium.  First, each producer j chooses Pjt1*=c for all 
t, t=1,2,...∞ and Pjt2*=c for all t, t=2,3,...∞.  Second, every consumer i born in period t, t=1,2,...∞, for 
whom vi>vL* purchases a new unit in period t and a new unit from firm jit in every period t′, t′=t,t+1,...∞, 
in which the consumer does not own a used unit at the beginning of the period, while consumers born in t 
for whom vi≤vL* never purchase new units.  Third, in any period t in which consumer i owns a used unit 
at the beginning of the period, the consumer maintains the unit if mitU≤m* and purchases a new unit if 
mitU>m*.13  Fourth, in any period t in which individual i consumes a new unit the individual purchases 
mN units of maintenance from a competitive maintenance seller, while in any period t in which individual 
i consumes a used unit the individual purchases mitU units of maintenance.  Fifth, no firm starts 
production after the first period. 
                                                     
13 Throughout the analysis we assume that a consumer who is indifferent between maintaining and replacing a used 
unit chooses to maintain it.  Further, a consumer who is indifferent between purchasing a new unit and consuming 
nothing chooses to consume nothing.  Neither assumption is essential but rather both serve to simplify the 
descriptions of equilibrium behavior. 
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 The logic behind the above equilibrium is as follows.  Consider the cohort of consumers born in 
the first period.  Because it is a competitive market, each durable-goods producer that sells a strictly 
positive number of new units to this cohort of consumers in the first period must market its product in the 
manner that minimizes the inefficiency associated with consuming the product.  This means that each 
such firm commits to charge c for new units to consumers both with and without trade-ins in all 
subsequent periods.  The reason is that, if maintenance and new units are both priced at marginal cost in 
all subsequent periods, the consumers will make efficient choices concerning who to purchase 
replacement units from and when to maintain rather than replace used units.  Further, since the price for a 
new unit in each subsequent period is c, the zero-profit condition associated with perfect competition 
yields that the first-period price also equals c.14  In turn, repeating this argument for each cohort of 
consumers yields that all units in all periods are sold at a price equal to c.  Finally, no firm starts 
production after the first period because learning-by-doing yields that it is less expensive for cohorts born 
after the first period to buy new units from firms that started production earlier. 
 We now turn our attention to what happens when the maintenance market is competitive and each 
durable-goods producer is not able to commit in the first period to the prices it will charge in subsequent 
periods for a new unit of output.  Below EUiC denotes the present discounted value evaluated in the period 
the consumer is born of the expected net benefits received by consumer i in this case, while EUi* denotes 
the present discounted value evaluated in the period the consumer is born of the expected net benefits 
received by consumer i in the benchmark case. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose the maintenance market is competitive.  If each firm cannot commit in the first 
period to the prices it will charge in subsequent periods for a new unit of output, then every equilibrium is 
characterized by values vLC, vL*<vLC<V, and mC, mC>m*, such that i) through vi) describe the 
equilibrium.15
 i) For every firm j and period t such that the firm first sells new units in period t, Pjt1C=P′<c,      
                                                     
14 To be precise, the zero-profit condition yields that the first-period price equals c′ which we denote as c since we 
focus on the nature of equilibrium in the limit as c′ approaches c from above.  Similarly, the critical value for vi for 
consumers born in period 1 is higher than vL* but we write it as vL* since again we focus on the nature of 
equilibrium in the limit as c′ approaches c from above.  We employ similar transformations in later results.  
 
15 There are multiple equilibria because, for example, how many firms start selling in each period is not uniquely 
defined. 
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    while Pjt1C=P′+Δ for every firm j and period t such that the firm sold new units prior to t.  
ii) For every firm j and period t, Pjt2C=P′′, c<P′′≤P′+Δ. 
iii) Each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vLC (vi≤vLC) purchases a new unit in period t  
      from a firm that first sells new units in that period and mN units of maintenance from a  
      competitive maintenance seller (never purchases new units, used units, or maintenance). 
iv) In each period t′, t′>t, each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vLC and who does not    
      own a used unit at the beginning of the period purchases a new unit from firm jit and mN units   
      of maintenance from a competitive maintenance seller. 
  v) In each period t′, t′>t, each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vLC and who does own a    
     used unit at the beginning of the period purchases a new unit from firm jit and mN units of   
     maintenance from a competitive maintenance seller if mitU>mC, and purchases mitU units of  
     maintenance from a competitive maintenance seller if mitU≤mC. 
vi) EUiC<(=)EUi* for all i for whom vi>(≤)vL*. 
 
 Proposition 1 tells us that, when the maintenance market is competitive and firms cannot commit 
in the first period to future prices for new units, inefficiencies arise.  The first inefficiency is that 
maintenance decisions are different than the first-best or commitment maintenance decisions.  The logic 
here is as follows.  Think back to the commitment case.  In that case each durable-goods producer 
commits in the first period to new-unit prices in every period t, t≥1, equal to c.  The result was that 
consumers made efficient choices each period concerning when to maintain rather than replace used units.   
Now consider what happens in the absence of commitment.  In particular, consider a firm that 
sells new units for the first time in period t and its pricing decision in subsequent periods.  As in the 
commitment case, the firm could choose to price new units in all subsequent periods at c and, if it chose 
this behavior, then the firm’s consumers would make efficient maintenance choices.  However, this 
behavior translates into present discounted value of profits for the firm in periods t+1 and later equal to 
zero.  But clearly, since the switching cost means the firm has market power in selling new units after 
period t to consumers who purchased new units from the firm in period t, the firm can earn a strictly 
positive present discounted value of expected profits in periods t+1 and later by setting new-unit prices 
above c.  The result is that the firm chooses new-unit prices in periods t+1 and later above c and 
consumers no longer make efficient choices concerning whether to maintain or replace their used units.  
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Rather, because new-unit prices are above the firm’s marginal cost of production while maintenance is 
priced competitively, consumers maintain their used units more often than is efficient and there is a 
corresponding reduction in both consumer and social welfare. 
 The second inefficiency is that fewer individuals consume the durable product (and maintenance) 
than in the first-best or commitment case.  This result is a consequence of the first inefficiency described 
above.  In both the commitment and no-commitment cases, individuals consume the durable product as 
long as the net benefit of doing so is greater than or equal to zero.  Holding vi fixed, the inefficient 
maintenance decisions in the no-commitment case lower the net benefit of consuming the durable 
product.  The result is that some individuals who receive positive net benefits from consuming the durable 
product in the commitment case would receive strictly negative net benefits from consuming the product 
in the no-commitment case.  Hence, in the first-best or commitment case these individuals purchase the 
product while they do not in the no-commitment case.16
The third inefficiency is that, similar to a result found in Farrell and Shapiro (1988), each new 
cohort of consumers when first entering the market purchases new durable units from a set of durable-
goods producers who start production in that period.  This is inefficient because learning-by-doing means 
the first-best efficient outcome minimizes the number of new units produced by firms that are in their first 
period of operation.  The reason that in Proposition 1 each cohort of consumers purchases from a different 
set of durable-goods producers is the limited ability that firms have to price discriminate in the setting 
considered in Proposition 1.17   
To see this, consider the cohort of consumers born in period t, t>1.  For firms that have not sold 
new units prior to period t, competition and the fact that selling to such a consumer in period t will yield 
positive profits in later periods means that such firms will be willing to sell new units in period t to 
consumers in this cohort at a price strictly less than c.  Further, because of competition, the present 
                                                     
16 Note that, although the set of individuals who purchase the durable product in the no-commitment case is not 
first-best efficient, it is second-best efficient.  That is, if we take as fixed the inefficient maintenance decisions, then 
the set of individuals who choose to purchase and consume the durable product is the socially optimal set. 
 
17 Farrell and Shapiro consider a duopoly model characterized by switching costs and consumers who enter the 
market in every period.  In their analysis one firm sells new units to new consumers in even periods while the other 
sells new units to new consumers in odd periods.  The similarity is that, in both analyses, each new cohort of 
consumers when entering the market purchases new durable units from durable-goods producers who are not trying 
to sell replacement units in that period to older consumers, where this occurs because of the limited ability for firms 
to price discriminate. 
15 
discounted value of expected profits from period t forward associated with such sales equals exactly zero.  
Now consider a firm that sold new units prior to period t.  From above, we know that selling to a 
consumer born in period t requires a period-t price below c and the sale would yield a present discounted 
value of expected profits from period t forward equal to zero.  The result is that, since switching costs 
mean the firm can earn positive profits by having the period-t price for a consumer who does not trade-in 
a used unit be above c, the firm maximizes profits by not selling to consumers born in period t. 
 The next step of the analysis is to consider actions that a firm might take in order to avoid the 
inefficiencies identified above.  In particular, we explore the extent to which a competitive durable-goods 
producer can avoid these inefficiencies by monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product.  
Below EUiM denotes the present discounted value evaluated in the period the consumer is born of the 
expected net benefits received by consumer i in this case.  Also, pjtN denotes the price that durable-goods 
producer j charges in period t for mN units of maintenance to individuals who purchase new units of 
output from the firm in period t, while pjtU(m) denotes the price that durable-goods producer j charges in 
period t for m units of maintenance to individuals who own used units of the firm’s product at the 
beginning of period t. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose each firm cannot commit in the first period to the prices it will charge in 
subsequent periods for a new unit of output, but each firm has the option of monopolizing the 
maintenance market for its own product at the beginning of each period.  Then every equilibrium is 
characterized by i) through vi), where in each equilibrium every durable-goods producer monopolizes the 
maintenance market for its own product and includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in 
every period t, t≥1.18  
 i) For every firm j and period t, if firm j sold new units in the first period then Pjt1M+pjtN=P+<c+  
    mN and Pjt2M+pjtN=Pjt3M+pjtN=P++Δ.  Also, no firm starts production after the first perod.   
ii) For every firm j and period t, if firm j sold new units in the first period then pjtU(m)=P++Δ for  
     all m<m*, pjtU(m)>P++Δ for all m>m*, and pjtU(m)≥P++Δ for m=m*. 
iii) Each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vL* (vi≤vL*) purchases a new unit and mN units  
                                                     
18 There are multiple equilibria of the type described for a variety of reasons including that pjtU(m) is not uniquely 
defined and when a firm sells a new unit and mN units of maintenance the sum of the prices is uniquely defined but 
the individual prices are not.   
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      of maintenance in period t from the same durable-goods producer (never purchases new units,  
      used units, or maintenance).  
iv) In each period t′, t′>t, each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vL* and who does not   
      own a used unit at the beginning of the period purchases a new unit and mN units of   
      maintenance from firm jit. 
v) In each period t′, t′>t, each consumer i born in period t who does own a used unit at the  
     beginning of the period purchases a new unit and mN units of maintenance from firm jit if  
     mitU>m*, purchases mitU units of maintenance from firm jit if mitU<m*, and chooses one of  
     these two behaviors if mitU=m*. 
vi) EUiM=EUi* for all i. 
 
 Proposition 2 demonstrates that a durable-goods producer can avoid the inefficiencies identified 
above by monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product.  The logic here is as follows.  As just 
discussed, because the prices for replacement units are above marginal cost when the maintenance market 
is competitive and commitment is not possible, consumers in that case make inefficient maintenance 
decisions and this also causes fewer individuals to consume the durable product than in the commitment 
case.  Now consider a durable-goods producer that monopolizes the maintenance market for its own 
product in every period.  By optimally setting the prices for replacement units and the price schedules for 
maintenance, in every period the firm is able to extract all the surplus from consumers who purchased 
new units from the firm in previous periods (call them the firm’s “repeat customers”).  In turn, since the 
firm is able to extract all the surplus, the firm has an incentive to induce its repeat customers to make 
efficient maintenance decisions.  The result is that consumers make efficient maintenance choices and 
this, in turn, also causes the same set of individuals to consume the durable product as in the commitment 
case.  
 To be more specific, the firm extracts all the surplus from repeat customers by charging P++Δ for 
replacement units with mN units of maintenance and the same price P++Δ for used-unit maintenance levels 
less than m*, where new units with mN units of maintenance are available at the same time from other 
firms at the price P+.  The firm then induces efficient maintenance versus replacement decisions by 
charging more than P++Δ for used-unit maintenance levels above m*, which causes repeat customers with 
required maintenance levels above m* to replace rather than maintain their used units.  Notice that there is 
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surplus to be captured by the firm both because of the switching cost and because some used units require 
less than m* units of maintenance.19
 Now let us discuss the role of the no-trade clauses in the equilibrium maintenance contracts.  As 
stated earlier, the no-trade clause allows a firm to price discriminate between new customers and repeat 
customers.  That is, in the absence of such clauses, the possibility of resale limits a firm’s ability to lower 
the price a firm offers a new consumer (since such a consumer could resell the new unit and maintenance 
to the firm’s repeat customers to whom the firm would like to charge higher prices).  In turn, this 
improved ability to price discriminate is what allows for the elimination of the third inefficiency 
associated with Proposition 1.  As discussed above, given learning-by-doing, efficiency requires 
minimizing the number of new units produced by firms that are in their first period of operation.  The 
improved ability to price discriminate associated with no-trade clauses minimizes this number by having 
no firm start production after the first period.   
 It is also of interest that evidence in the Kodak case is consistent with the type of price 
discrimination between new customers and repeat customers found in Proposition 2.  In particular, in the 
majority opinion in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case, Judge Blackmun argues that the evidence 
presented by Kodak is consistent with Kodak price discriminating by charging low prices to new 
customers and high prices to repeat customers who face high switching costs.    
 Finally, suppose the model did not incorporate learning-by-doing, i.e., each durable-goods 
producer had a constant marginal cost of c independent of whether it had strictly positive production in 
the previous period.  Then, in addition to the equilibria described in Proposition 2, there would be another 
set of equilibria in which durable-goods producers do not include no-trade clauses in their maintenance 
contracts.  Besides the non-inclusion of the no-trade clauses, the only other difference between these 
equilibria and the ones described in Proposition 2 is that each cohort of consumers purchases from 
durable-goods producers who start their operations in the period that the consumers are born.  The logic 
for this last result is the same as that given for the similar result found in Proposition 1.  Because of the 
possibility of resale on the secondhand market, without the no-trade clause a durable-goods producer 
                                                     
19 In equilibrium, consumers who own used units with required maintenance levels less than m* are indifferent 
between maintaining and replacing their used units.  One could think of the firm charging P++Δ-ε for maintenance 
levels below m* to ensure that these consumers maintain rather than replace their used units.  However, since the 
smallest strictly positive value for ε is not defined, any Nash equilibrium will be such that the firm charges P++Δ for 
used-unit maintenance levels below m* and consumers with used units with required maintenance levels below m* 
choose to maintain them. 
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cannot offer a lower new-unit price to a newly-born consumer than to a consumer who purchased from 
the firm in the past.  In turn, because switching costs mean firms would like to price discriminate between 
these groups, the end result is that in the absence of no-trade clauses each cohort of consumers purchases 
from a different set of durable-goods producers.  As indicated, the presence of learning-by-doing 
eliminates these equilibria because with learning-by-doing it is not efficient to have each new cohort of 
consumers purchase from a new set of durable-goods producers. 
 
III. EXTENSIONS 
 In this section we discuss two extensions of the model analyzed in the previous section.  The first 
addresses why a firm would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product rather than sign a 
long-term contract that specifies future prices for replacement units.  The second explains why a firm 
would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product by refusing to sell spare parts to 
alternative maintenance suppliers rather than simply raise the price for spare parts. 
 
A) Why Not Long-Term Contracts? 
 In the analysis of Section II a durable-goods producer could ensure efficiency in either of two  
ways.  It could ensure efficiency by either monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product or 
signing long-term contracts with consumers that specify future prices for new units.  But this raises the 
question, since a long-term contract of this sort would not be difficult to write, why would a firm 
monopolize the maintenance market for its own product rather than sign such a long-term contract?  In 
this subsection we discuss a variant of the model considered in Section II that addresses this question. 
 In this extension everything is the same as in the model of Section II except that a firm makes a 
once and for all choice of durability at the beginning of the first period prior to other decisions, where an 
increase in the durability built into new units both increases the marginal cost of production and reduces 
the expected level of maintenance required by units when they become used (similar results would be 
found by assuming that each firm makes a durability choice for each period at the beginning of the 
period).  To be specific, each firm j chooses a durability level in its first period of operation, denoted dj.  
Firm j’s marginal cost in this first period is then c′+s(dj) while in later periods it is c+s(dj), where c′>c>0, 
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s(0)=0, s(∞)=∞, s′(0)=0, and s′(d)>0 and s′′(d)>0 for all d>0.20  Further, the level of maintenance required 
by a used durable unit produced by any firm j is given by qU/(1+dj).  In this specification qU is the 
realization of a random draw from the probability density function k(.), where k(qU)>0 for all qU∈(0,∞).   
 In addition to the information assumptions made in Section II, we now also assume that a firm’s 
durability choice is neither publicly observable nor verifiable.  We believe this is a natural assumption 
given durability controls the speed of product deterioration which in the real world is frequently difficult 
to judge by observing products when they are new.  By assuming durability choice is neither publicly 
observable nor verifiable, we introduce the possibility of a standard moral-hazard problem in which firms 
underinvest in durability because each period’s new-unit prices do not directly reflect durability choice.  
Finally, our focus is again on the nature of equilibrium in the limit as c′ approaches c from above.    
 In Proposition 3 we analyze the above model under the assumption that a durable-goods producer 
can either sign long-term contracts that specify future prices for replacement units or monopolize the 
maintenance market.  Below d* denotes the first-best durability choice. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose each firm can either commit in the first period to the prices it will charge in 
subsequent periods for a new unit of output or the firm can monopolize the maintenance market for its 
own product at the beginning of each period.  Then, substituting c+s(d*) for c in i) of Proposition 2, every 
equilibrium is characterized by i) through vi) of Proposition 2, where in each equilibrium every durable-
goods producer chooses durability level d*, monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product, and 
includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in every period t, t≥1.    
   
 Proposition 3 tells us that in this model, even though both long-term contracts and monopolizing 
the maintenance market are available for avoiding the maintenance versus replacement inefficiency, the 
only equilibria are ones in which firms choose to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own 
products.  To understand this result, first consider why long-term contracts that specify future prices for 
replacement units result in a first-best outcome in the model of Section II.  In that analysis the main 
behavior that needs to be controlled to achieve a first-best outcome is each consumer’s choices 
concerning when to maintain and when to replace used units.  In turn, a firm can provide its consumers 
                                                     
20 We also assume that s(.) is sufficiently convex that the first-best-durability choice is uniquely defined. 
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with an incentive to make efficient maintenance decisions by committing to future prices for replacement 
units equal to the marginal cost of production. 
 Now consider what happens given the model considered here when a firm signs a long-term 
contract that specifies future prices for replacement units.  As before, efficiency requires each consumer 
to make efficient decisions concerning whether to maintain or replace used units.  But now efficiency also 
requires each firm to make an efficient choice concerning the durability of its output.  The problem is that 
a firm that simply commits to future prices for replacement units cannot induce both behaviors to be 
chosen efficiently.  To see this, suppose a firm that sells new units in the first period charges a price and 
commits to future prices for replacement units equal to the marginal cost of production that corresponds 
to the first-best level of durability (given an efficient durability choice, these are the prices needed for the 
replacement versus maintenance decisions to be efficient and for the firm to earn zero expected profits).  
Given this commitment, the firm would not have an incentive to make the efficient durability choice.  The 
reason is that, if it makes the efficient durability choice, then as indicated the firm’s present discounted 
value of profits equals exactly zero.  But, given that the durability choice is unobservable, the firm could 
increase this present discounted value by lowering the durability level below the efficient amount.    
 The final step of the argument is to consider what happens when a firm chooses to monopolize 
the maintenance market for its own product in each period rather than commit to future prices for 
replacement units.  The result is that the firm makes the efficient durability choice and consumers make 
efficient choices concerning maintenance, where the logic for this result is the same as the logic for why 
monopolizing the maintenance market resulted in first-best behavior in Section II.  By monopolizing the 
maintenance market in any pair of periods t-1 and t a firm is able to extract all the surplus from 
individuals who consumed a unit of the firm’s product in period t-1.  In turn, since the firm is able to 
extract all the surplus, the firm has an incentive for decisions to be efficient.  The result is that consumers 
make efficient maintenance choices and the firm chooses the efficient durability level.        
 
B) Why Not Increase the Price for Spare Parts?
 One interesting aspect of the allegations against Kodak and the other firms that have  
monopolized the maintenance markets for their own products concerns the manner with which that  
monopolization is typically achieved.  As mentioned in the Introduction, a typical allegation is that the 
durable-goods producer monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product by refusing to sell spare 
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parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  But as pointed out earlier by Chen, Ross, and Stanbury (1998), 
this raises the question, why doesn’t the firm simply increase the price for spare parts rather than refuse to 
sell spare parts and monopolize the maintenance market?  Here we discuss a variant of the model 
considered in Section II that addresses this question. 
 In this extension everything is the same as in the model of Section II except that maintenance 
consists of both service and replacement parts.  A new unit of output requires one unit of service and a 
fixed number of replacement parts that we denote rN, rN≥0, while a used unit requires one unit of service 
and a stochastic number of parts, denoted rU.  The value for rU for any specific used unit is the realization 
of a random draw from the probability density function h(.), where h(rU)>0 for all rU∈(0,∞).  Similar to 
the model of Section II, we assume that a consumer who owns a used unit at the beginning of a period 
observes the number of replacement parts that will be required by his or her used durable unit.21  Further, 
replacement parts for a durable unit produced by firm j can only be manufactured by firm j itself.  Hence, 
firm j’s products can be maintained by alternative maintenance suppliers only if these suppliers are able to 
purchase replacement parts from firm j.  There are no fixed costs for producing either parts or service, 
while the monopolist’s constant marginal cost for producing parts is cr, cr>0, and every firm has a 
constant marginal cost of providing service equal to cs, cs>0.  Finally, we assume V>c+cs+rNcr which is 
analogous to the assumption in Section II that V>c+mN (and we again consider the nature of equilibrium 
in the limit as c′ approaches c from above). 
 In Proposition 4 we analyze this model under the assumption that each durable-goods producer 
must choose to either allow competition in the maintenance market by selling replacement parts to 
alternative maintenance suppliers or monopolize the maintenance market by refusing to sell spare parts to 
alternative maintenance suppliers.22
 
Proposition 4: Suppose each firm cannot commit in the first period to the prices it will charge in 
subsequent periods for a new unit of output, but each firm has the option of monopolizing the 
maintenance market for its own product at the beginning of each period by refusing to sell spare parts to 
                                                     
21 Although we have not shown this formally, we believe the conclusions also follow if each consumer does not 
observe the exact number of replacement parts that will be required by his or her used unit, but only observes a 
signal indicating the expected number of parts that will be required. 
 
22 Equivalently, a durable-goods producer could monopolize the maintenance market by offering to sell spare parts 
but setting a prohibitively high price on the parts. 
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alternative maintenance suppliers.  Then in every equilibrium every durable-goods producer monopolizes 
the maintenance market for its own product and includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in 
every period t, t≥1.23
 
 Proposition 4 tells us that, if each durable-goods producer cannot commit to future prices for new 
units, then as in Section II in every period each firm monopolizes the maintenance market for its own 
product.  There is a difference, however, in that now each firm chooses this behavior rather than allow 
competition in the maintenance market by selling replacement parts and simply increase the replacement-
part price.24  The logic for this result is as follows.  Let r* be such that it is efficient for used units to be 
maintained when rU<r* and for used units to be replaced when rU>r*, and consider consumers who own 
used units of firm j’s output at the beginning of a period.  Similar to what we found in Proposition 2, in 
this extension each firm j extracts all the surplus from consumers whose used units require rU<r* 
replacement parts by charging them a price for maintenance equal to P++Δ.25  That is, extracting all the 
surplus from these consumers requires that the price charged to each such consumer for maintenance be 
independent of the amount of maintenance required by the consumer’s used unit or, more precisely, 
independent of the number of replacement parts required. 
 Given this, suppose a firm does not monopolize the maintenance market but rather simply 
increases the price for replacement parts.  Let PRt be the price the durable-goods producer charges for a 
replacement part in period t and rit denote the number of replacement parts required by the used unit 
owned by individual i at the beginning of period t.  Because the maintenance market is competitive, in 
equilibrium the price charged in any period t for maintenance that consists of one unit of service and rit 
replacement parts will be cS+ritPRt.  That is, the price of maintenance will be increasing in the number of 
replacement parts required.  But since extracting all the surplus from consumers who choose to maintain 
                                                     
23 Also, results similar to i) through vi) of Proposition 2 hold, where the differences are that the maintenance price 
function, maintenance costs, and the critical maintenance level defining the maintenance versus replacement 
decision are all defined in terms of the number of spare parts required rather than the level of maintenance required. 
 
24 If we combined the first and second extensions then, whether or not a firm could commit to future prices for new 
units, each durable-goods producer would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product rather than allow 
competition in that market and simply increase the price for replacement parts. 
 
25 On the other hand, each firm j induces other consumers whose used units require rU>r* replacement parts to 
purchase firm j’s new units at P++Δ by charging them a price for maintenance higher than P++Δ (consumers for 
whom rU=r* can either purchase maintenance or buy a new unit in equilibrium). 
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their used units requires that these consumers pay a price for maintenance, P++Δ, that is independent of 
the number of replacement parts required, we now have that by simply increasing the price of 
replacement parts the firm is unable to extract all the surplus in period t from these consumers.  Hence, 
since monopolizing the maintenance market allows a firm to extract all the surplus from these consumers 
while simply increasing the price of replacement parts does not, the firm will choose to monopolize the 
maintenance market. 
               
IV. DISCUSSION 
 In this section we first discuss the major alternative explanations that have been put forth for why 
a durable-goods producer would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product, and then  
discuss the antitrust implications of our analysis. 
 
A) Alternative Theories
 We begin by discussing three closely related theories in which the firm monopolizes the 
maintenance market in order to exploit market power after consumers are locked-in.  The literature does 
not always make a clear distinction between the terms consumer lock-in and consumer switching costs.  
In the discussion that follows we do make a clear distinction between these terms.  We use the term 
consumer lock-in to refer to a setting in which a consumer who has purchased a durable good needs to 
also purchase maintenance to consume the good.  We use the term consumer switching costs to refer to a 
setting in which a consumer faces a cost of switching between producers at the date that the consumer 
replaces a used unit with a new unit.  The first three theories discussed below require consumer lock-in 
but not consumer switching costs, i.e., a durable unit requires maintenance but a consumer is indifferent 
between different firms’ products at the time that replacement occurs.  In contrast, our analysis 
incorporates both consumer lock-in and consumer switching costs, i.e., a durable unit requires 
maintenance and at the replacement date a consumer prefers a new unit produced by the same firm that 
manufactured the unit the individual consumed in the previous period. 
 A key element in these three theories is that consumers are locked-in once they purchase a new 
unit of output from a durable-goods producer.  The producer exploits the consumers’ locked-in positions 
by first stopping other firms from selling maintenance and then raising the price of maintenance, which 
results in a standard deadweight loss.  The deadweight loss has two components.  Consumers of used 
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units purchase less than the socially optimal amount of maintenance and consumers replace their used 
units too quickly.  In the “surprise” theory, consumers expect that the maintenance market will remain 
competitive.  The result is that consumers are hurt by the maintenance-market monopoly both because of 
the equivalent of a lump sum transfer between the consumers and the firm caused by the surprise and the 
standard deadweight loss mentioned above.  In contrast, in the closely related “costly-information” theory 
consumers simply ignore the cost of maintenance in their original decisions to purchase new units.  In this 
theory there is no transfer between the consumers and the firms because competitive firms will reduce the 
price for new units so that they receive zero profits in equilibrium.26  However, similar to the surprise 
theory, the monopoly pricing of maintenance results in a standard deadweight loss.27
 The third theory that depends on the exploitation of locked-in consumers is the “lack-of-
commitment” theory developed in Borenstein et al. (1995).  In contrast to the two theories described 
above, in this explanation consumers correctly anticipate whether a durable-goods producer will 
monopolize the maintenance market and are willing to pay less for a new unit when they anticipate 
monopolization.  In such circumstances a durable-goods producer would want to commit to allowing 
competition in the maintenance market, but monopolization occurs because of a lack of ability to commit.  
In this theory, as in the costly-information theory, the only cost of the practice is the deadweight loss due 
to the monopoly pricing of maintenance.  Note, both Shapiro (1995) and Chen and Ross (1998) provide 
formal analyses that suggest this deadweight loss is likely to be small. 
 One can question the applicability of each of the above theories to the cases in which 
monopolizing the maintenance market has been observed.  For example, the costly-information theory 
assumes uninformed consumers which seems unlikely in many of the cases in which the cost of 
maintenance was a significant proportion of the total cost of using the product.  Similarly, the lack-of-
commitment theory assumes commitment is not possible but this also seems to be of questionable 
applicability because long-term maintenance contracts are quite common in many of the industries in 
which the practice has been observed.  Further, another criticism applies equally to all three theories.  As 
                                                     
26 The discussions we have seen of the surprise theory do not make clear why in that theory competition in the 
market for new units does not eliminate the transfer between consumers and firms. 
 
27 One other difference between the theories is that in the surprise theory a durable-goods producer that 
monopolizes the maintenance market is hurt in the market for new units because it establishes a reputation for 
exploiting locked-in consumers.  This is not true in the costly-information theory.  
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discussed earlier, in the typical case the durable-goods producer monopolizes the maintenance market by 
refusing to sell spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  The problem is that, at least in the 
original formulations, none of the three theories explains this behavior.  In each theory the durable-goods 
producer could have achieved its goal by simply raising the price of spare parts rather than monopolizing 
the maintenance market by refusing to sell spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.28
 Another explanation for maintenance-market monopoly is that the practice helps a firm more 
effectively price discriminate (this explanation is developed in Chen and Ross (1993) and Klein (1993)).  
This is the standard metered-sales explanation for tie-ins used, for example, to explain IBM’s practice of 
requiring purchasers of its tabulating machines to also purchase cards from IBM.  That is, in this theory 
consumers with higher valuations for the durable-goods-producer’s product are also heavier users of 
maintenance, with the result that the seller can more effectively price discriminate by monopolizing the 
maintenance market and raising its price.  This theory provides a rationale for why a firm with market 
power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product, but does not explain why a firm 
with little or no market power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product.29
 More recently, similar to our paper some authors have put forth efficiency rationales for 
maintenance-market monopolization, although different than our approach these authors have not focused 
on the role of switching costs.  For example, Chen and Ross (1999) consider a competitive setting in 
which consumers vary in their intensity of usage and each durable-goods producer bundles free 
maintenance for a limited time with the sale of a new durable unit.  They show that monopolizing the 
maintenance market after the free maintenance expires is needed to stop the subsidization of high-
                                                     
28 As argued earlier in Chen and Ross (1993,1998) and Klein (1993), one way of extending each of these theories 
so that monopolizing the maintenance market is preferred to simply raising the price of spare parts is by assuming 
that service and the replacement of defective parts are substitutes in the maintenance production function.  Given 
this assumption, if the durable-goods producer simply raised the price of spare parts, the alternative maintenance 
suppliers would respond by inefficiently substituting service for spare parts.  Hence, monopolizing the maintenance 
market would be more profitable because it would avoid this inefficient substitution of service for spare parts.  It is 
interesting to note that, in contrast to the public-policy recommendation that follows from the simple version of each 
of the theories, this extension suggests that the government should allow durable-goods producers to monopolize 
the maintenance markets for their own products unless the government also regulates the price of spare parts.  The 
reason is that, if the government does not regulate the price of spare parts, there will be a monopoly price for 
maintenance whether or not the government allows monopolization of the maintenance market and thus allowing 
monopolization is superior from a social-welfare standpoint because it avoids the inefficient substitution of service 
for spare parts. 
 
29 Klein argues that in the real world there is significant price discrimination even by firms with little market power, 
and thus that the price-discrimination argument should not be ruled out as a possible explanation for why such a 
firm would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product. 
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intensity users by low-intensity users, and the practice also increases social welfare due to more efficient 
maintenance decisions.  Another example is Elzinga and Mills (2001) who consider a durable-goods-
oligopoly model characterized by fixed costs and constant marginal costs for the production of durable 
units and maintenance.  They show that Ramsey-optimal pricing requires above marginal cost pricing for 
both new durable units and maintenance and this can only be achieved when a durable-goods producer 
monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product.30
 In summary, there are a number of alternative explanations for why a durable-goods producer 
would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product.  However, we believe that the explanation 
put forth in Sections II and III is a better match than any of the alternatives for the evidence in the Kodak 
case and other cases in which a firm with little or no market power monopolized the maintenance market 
for its own products.  For example, our theory explains why a durable-goods producer would monopolize 
the maintenance market even if consumers are well informed and long-term contracts are feasible.  In 
contrast, the costly-information theory and lack-of-commitment theories do not explain why a firm would 
monopolize the maintenance market in such a case.  Our theory is also consistent with a firm 
monopolizing the maintenance market when it has little or no market power, while the price 
discrimination theory fits more easily with firms characterized by significant market power.  Finally, as 
discussed further in the next subsection, our theory is the only one that incorporates consumer switching 
costs in an essential way and the evidence indicates that this was an important aspect of a number of the 
cases (see the Introduction for a discussion).  
 
B) Antitrust Implications
 Since the Kodak decision, significant attention has been paid to whether or not a durable-goods  
producer should be allowed to monopolize the maintenance market for its own products by refusing to 
sell spare parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  Based on previous theoretical explanations for this 
behavior discussed in Subsection IV.A, a number of authors have argued that prohibiting such behavior 
serves to enhance social welfare in certain settings (see, e.g., Salop (2000)).  We now discuss the 
                                                     
30 Another argument is the reputation argument put forth in Shapiro (1995).  Shapiro argues that, if a firm’s 
incentive to maintain a positive reputation due to effects on long-run profitability is sufficiently strong, then a 
durable-goods producer that monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product will charge a competitive 
rather than a monopoly price for maintenance.  Note that this argument does not, in fact, provide an explanation for 
maintenance-market monopolization in that in this argument the firm’s profitability from monopolizing the 
maintenance market is no higher than if it allowed the maintenance to be provided by competitive sellers. 
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implications of our analysis for whether the Courts should allow a durable-goods producer to monopolize 
the maintenance market for its own products.   
 We begin by reviewing what happens in our model when monopolizing the maintenance market 
is and is not allowed.  Suppose that firms cannot commit in the first period to future prices for new units 
and the maintenance market is competitive.  We showed that in this case, due to switching costs, firms 
charge high prices for replacement units which, in turn, reduces both social welfare and consumer 
welfare.  This reduction occurs mainly because consumers respond to the high prices for replacement 
units by sometimes maintaining used units when it would be efficient to replace those units.  Now 
suppose that each firm has the option of monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product.  The 
result is that each firm monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product and, because this avoids 
the inefficiency concerning consumer maintenance decisions, there is a corresponding increase in both 
social welfare and consumer welfare.     
 What do these results imply for the question considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Kodak 
case, i.e., should a durable-goods producer with little or no market power in the market for new units be 
allowed to monopolize the maintenance markets for its own products?  The Court’s ruling was that, even 
if Kodak had no market power in the market for new units, it could still be guilty of having illegally 
monopolized the maintenance markets for its own products by refusing to sell spare parts to alternative 
maintenance suppliers.  This ruling is consistent with the arguments of Borenstein et al. and others 
discussed previously.  They argue that when Kodak monopolized the maintenance market social welfare 
fell because a monopoly price for maintenance results in a standard deadweight loss, where this loss 
consists of two components.  One component is that consumers purchase less than the socially optimal 
amount of maintenance, while the other is that consumers replace their used units too quickly. 
 An important contribution of our analysis is to show that in the presence of consumer switching 
costs the social-welfare implications of how monopolizing the maintenance market affects replacement 
decisions are quite different than in the analyses of Borenstein et al. and others.  In particular, our analysis 
shows that, if in a setting characterized by competitive durable-goods producers there are consumer 
switching costs, then a competitive price for maintenance will result in consumers replacing used units 
inefficiently often while monopoly maintenance results in efficient decisions on this dimension.  Recall 
that the presence of consumer switching costs was an important aspect of the Kodak case (see the 
discussion in the Introduction).  Hence, we would argue that the U.S. Supreme Court made an incorrect 
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ruling in that case.  If a firm is judged to lack significant market power and there is also significant 
consumer switching costs, then the firm should be allowed to monopolize the maintenance market for its 
own product since in that type of setting the result of monopolization is improved efficiency concerning 
the replacement versus maintenance decision. 
 On the other hand, in the absence of consumer switching costs the argument for not allowing 
maintenance-market monopolization is stronger.  In the absence of switching costs, the arguments of 
Borenstein et al. and others suggest that maintenance-market monopolization may reduce social welfare 
because consumers purchase too little maintenance and replace their machines too often.  Hence, in such a 
setting not allowing maintenance-market monopolization may increase both social welfare and consumer 
welfare.  There are two complications associated with this argument, however.   
 First, suppose there are no consumer switching costs and a durable-goods producer wants to 
monopolize the maintenance markets for its own products for reasons consistent with the arguments of 
Borenstein et al. and others.  Further, suppose the firm achieves monopolization by refusing to sell spare 
parts to alternative maintenance suppliers.  Then eliminating the inefficiency might require not only for 
the firm to sell spare parts to the alternative suppliers but also for the government to regulate the price of 
spare parts (otherwise, the firm could achieve most or all of what it wants by simply raising the price of 
spare parts – see footnote 28 for a related discussion).  But this is problematic because it is not at all clear 
that regulating the price of spare parts is a feasible intervention for the antitrust authorities.  Second, in 
general it is difficult for courts to judge motivation and, given theory tells us that competitive firms 
typically behave in ways that maximize social welfare, the courts should be worried about type two 
errors, i.e., the courts prohibiting the practice when the practice in fact raises social welfare.  We thus feel 
that the evidence concerning motivation should be quite strong before the courts intervene.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper we demonstrated two important results.  Consider a setting characterized by  
consumer switching costs and an inability on the part of durable-goods producers to commit to future  
prices for replacement units.  Our first finding is that, if both the market for new durable units and the 
maintenance market are competitive, then inefficiencies result that lower both social welfare and 
consumer welfare.  The logic is that, in order to achieve efficient maintenance decisions on the part of 
consumers, a firm would like to commit to prices for replacement units equal to the marginal cost of 
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production.  However, in the absence of the ability to commit, the presence of consumer switching costs 
causes firms to charge prices for replacement units above marginal cost.  The result is inefficient 
maintenance decisions, fewer consumers purchasing the durable product than in the first-best or 
commitment case, and a corresponding reduction in both consumer welfare and social welfare. 
 Our second important finding is that monopolizing the maintenance market for its own product is 
a way for a competitive durable-goods producer to avoid the inefficiencies described above.  By 
monopolizing the maintenance market a firm is able to extract all the surplus at the date consumers are 
choosing whether to maintain or replace used units.  The result is that, because it is capturing all the 
surplus, the firm has an incentive to price in such a way that consumers make efficient choices concerning 
whether to maintain or replace used units and this, in turn, results in the first-best efficient number of 
consumers purchasing the durable product.  Further, since in a competitive market it is the consumers 
who capture any increase in social welfare, we now have that when a durable-goods producer 
monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product the result is an increase in both consumer and 
social welfare. 
 There are a number of directions in which the analysis in this paper could be extended.  However, 
the one that we feel is the most interesting is extending our result concerning the importance of 
commitment in competitive durable-goods markets.  As we briefly discussed in the Introduction, earlier 
literature on commitment in durable-goods markets builds on the initial insight of Coase (1972) and 
Bulow (1982) and focuses on monopoly models.  In Sections II and III we showed that whether or not a 
firm has the ability to commit can also be important in a competitive durable-goods setting when there are 
consumer switching costs.  The finding is interesting because it suggests that the issue of commitment and 
time inconsistency may be important in many more durable-goods markets than previously realized.  In 
future work we plan to extend our analysis both by investigating whether there are alternative avenues 
through which the ability to commit becomes important in competitive settings, and whether there are 
practices other than monopolizing the maintenance market that competitive firms may employ in order to 
avoid problems due to an inability to commit.  
APPENDIX 
We first  define some notation.  Let ξ be a function whose arguments are m and vi.  Throughout 
the proofs E(ξ) will denote the unconditional expected value of ξ, while Ei(ξ) denotes the expected value 
conditional on vi.  Also, let Vi be the value of consumer i at the beginning of a period in which the 
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consumer does not own a used unit but consumed a used unit in the previous period, while ViU(m) is the 
value of consumer i at the beginning of a period in which the consumer owns a used unit with 
maintenance realization m. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: We first show that there exists an equilibrium that satisfies vL*<vLC<V, mC>m*, 
and i) through vi).  We then argue that no equilibrium exists that does not satisfy these conditions.  Note, 
since we consider the nature of equilibrium in the limit as c′ approaches c from above, we let c′ be 
arbitrarily close to c.      
We start by supposing that in any period t every firm that has not sold new units in the past offers 
a new unit at a price P′, c-Δ<P′<c, where P′ satisfies a zero-profit condition, and that there is never trade 
on the secondhand market.  Because of the switching cost, we know that a firm for whom there are 
consumers who consumed a unit of the firm’s product in the previous period can earn positive profits by 
setting Pjt1C≥Pjt2C>P′ and selling a positive number of units.  Given that P′ satisfies a zero-profit condition, 
we thus have that Pjt1C≥Pjt2C>P′ for such a firm.  
Given this, consider first a consumer who does not own a used unit at the beginning of period t 
and did not consume a unit in the previous period.  This consumer can either purchase nothing or 
purchase a new unit and mN units of maintenance.  Given Pjt1C>P′, if the consumer chooses the latter 
option he or she is best off purchasing from a firm that has not sold new units in the past.  Hence, EUiC is 
given by (A1). 
(A1)                                              EUiC=max{0+βEUiC,vi-P′-mN+βEi(ViU(m))} 
(A1) tells us that consumer i never purchases a new unit if vi-P′-mN+βEi(ViU(m))≤0. 
 Now consider a consumer who does not own a used unit at the beginning of period t but 
consumed a unit in the previous period produced by firm j.  This consumer can either purchase nothing, 
purchase a new unit from firm j at the price Pjt1C and mN units of maintenance, or purchase a new unit 
from a different manufacturer and mN units of maintenance (as earlier, the best option in this case is to 
purchase a new unit at a price P′ from a firm that has not sold new units in the past).  Hence, Vi is given 
by (A2). 
(A2)                           Vi=max{0+βEUiC,vi+Δ-Pjt1C-mN+βEi(ViU(m)),vi-P′-mN+βEi(ViU(m))} 
Similarly, consider a consumer who owns a used unit at the beginning of period t that was produced by 
firm j and has maintenance requirement m.  This consumer either purchases nothing, purchases m units of 
maintenance, purchases a new unit from firm j at either Pjt1C or Pjt2C, or purchases a new unit from a 
different manufacturer .  Hence, ViU(m) must satisfy (A3). 
(A3)    ViU(m)=max{0+βEUiC,v i+Δ-m+βVi,vi+Δ-min(Pjt1C,Pjt2C)-mN+βEi(ViU(m)),vi-P′-mN+βEi(ViU(m))} 
 Consider a firm that is choosing Pjt1C and there are consumers in period t who consumed a unit of 
the firm’s product in the previous period but do not own a used unit at the beginning of period t.  Given 
we know from above that each such consumer must satisfy vi-P′-mN+βEiU(ViU(m))>0 and that the firm 
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cannot earn positive profits by selling to consumers who did not consume a unit of the firm’s product in 
the previous period, (A2) and (A3) immediately tell us that the optimal choice must satisfy Pjt1C≤P′+Δ.  
Further, since for any Pjt1C<P′+Δ the firm could increase profits by raising the price slightly, we have 
Pjt1C=P′+Δ.  Hence, (A2) reduces to (A4) for each such consumer. 
(A4)                                                      Vi=vi-P′-mN+βEi(ViU(m)) 
Note also, suppose there is a strictly positive probability such a consumer purchases a new unit from a 
different manufacturer.  Then the firm could slightly lower Pjt1C and increase its profits.  Hence, all such 
consumers must purchase new units from firm j. 
 Now consider a firm that is choosing Pjt2C and there are consumers in period t who own a used 
unit of the firm’s product at the beginning of period t.  By assumption Pjt2C≤Pjt1C and also by assumption 
there is a unique optimal value (see footnote 6).  Call this optimal value P′′.  Further, suppose P′′=P′+Δ 
and there is a strictly positive probability that a consumer who owns a used unit of firm j’s product at the 
beginning of period t purchases from a different manufacturer or purchases nothing.  Then the firm could 
slightly lower Pjt2C and increase its profits.  Hence, all such consumers either maintain their used units or 
purchase new units from firm j which, in turn, means (A3) reduces to (A5). 
(A5)                                    ViU(m)=max{vi+Δ-m+βVi,vi+Δ-P′′-mN+βEi(ViU(m))} 
 Consider a consumer born in period t who maintains a used unit in any period t in which he or she 
owns a used unit with maintenance realization m, m≤m′, and purchases a new unit at cost c and mN units 
of maintenance otherwise.  Let kt*(m′) be the expected present discounted value evaluated in period t of 
the costs incurred by such a consumer.  Also, analogously define ktC(m′) for the case in which a new unit 
is purchased from some firm j rather than being purchased at cost c.  For notational convenience, in what 
follows let kt*(m′)=k*(m′), kt+1*(m′)=k′*(m′), ktC(m′)=kC(m′), and kt+1C(m′)=k′C(m′).  Finally, let Bi be the 
present discounted value evaluated in period t of the stream of gross benefits of a consumer born in period 
t who consumes a new or used unit produced by some firm j (with appropriate levels of maintenance) in 
every period starting in period t.  
 Consider again a consumer who owns a used unit at the beginning of a period and the consumer’s 
decision concerning whether to maintain or replace the unit.  (A5) tells us that for each such consumer i 
there is a value miC defined by (A6) such that the consumer maintains the unit if m≤miC and purchases a 
new unit if m>miC (see footnote 13). 
(A6)                                                      miC=P′′+mN-β[Ei(ViU(m))-Vi] 
From above we know that Ei(ViU(m))=Bi+Δ-k′C(miC), while Vi for this consumer can be written as 
Vi=Bi+Δ -(P′+Δ)-mN-βk′C(miC).  In turn, this yields that Ei(ViU(m))-Vi=(P′+Δ)+mN-(1-β)k′C(miC).  But we 
know that miC must maximize Ei(ViU(m)) which, given Ei(ViU(m))=Bi+Δ-k′C(miC), means k′C(miC) does 
not vary with i.  Further, since Ei(ViU(m))-Vi=(P′+Δ)+mN-(1-β)k′C(miC), we now have that Ei(ViU(m))-Vi 
does not vary with i.  (A6) now reduces to (A7) for every such consumer i. 
(A7)                                                      miC=mC=P′′+mN-β[Ei(ViU(m))-Vi] 
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We know Ei(ViU(m))=Bi+Δ-k′C(mC) while Vi=Bi+Δ-(P′+Δ)-mN-βk′C(mC).  Hence, (A7) yields (A8). 
(A8)                                                   mC=P′′+mN-β(P′+Δ)-βmN+β(1-β)k′C(mC) 
By the definition of m* we have (A9). 
(A9)                                                      m*=c+mN-β[Ei(ViU*(m))-Vi*], 
where Vi* and ViU*(m) are the value functions in the benchmark case.  We know Ei(ViU*(m))=Bi+Δ-
k′*(m*) while Vi*=Bi+Δ-c-mN-βk′*(m*).  Hence, (A9) can be written as (A10). 
(A10)                                                     m*=c+mN-βc-βmN+β(1-β)k′*(m*) 
(A8) and (A10) yield (A11). 
(A11)                               mC-m*=P′′-β(P′+Δ)-(c-βc)+β(1-β)(k′C(mC)-k′*(m*)) 
 Let πU be the present discounted value of the profit stream from period t forward of a durable-
goods producer selling to a consumer who owns a used unit of the firm’s product at the beginning of 
period t.  P′′ will be chosen to maximize p(P′′)[(P′′-c)+βπU]+(1-p(P′′))β(P′+Δ-c+βπU), where p(⋅) is the 
probability the consumer purchases a new unit from the firm in period t as a function of the unit’s price.  
Since P′′ maximizes this expression and P′+Δ-c+βπU>πU, we have P′′>c.  Given P′+Δ>c, P′′>c, and 
k′*(m) is the minimum value for k′*(⋅), we know k′C(mC)>k′*(m*). 
 Suppose P′′=P′+Δ.  Given P′+Δ>c and k′C(mC)>k′*(m*), (A11) yields mC>m*.  Now consider the 
case P′′<P′+Δ.  As stated before, P′′ is chosen to maximize p(P′′)[(P′′-c)+βπU]+(1-p(P′′))β(P′+Δ-c+βπU).  
Given this and P′′<P′+Δ, P′′ must satisfy the following first-order condition. 
(A12)                      p(P′′)+[dp(P′′)/dP′′)](P′′-c+βπU)-[dp(P′′)/dP′′]β(P′+Δ-c+βπU)=0 
Since p(P′′)>0 and dp(P′′)/dP′′<0, (A12) yields  
(A13)                                               P′′-β(P′+Δ)-(c-βc)+β(1-β)πU>0. 
Suppose mC=m*.  Then k′C(mC)-k′*(m*)=πU.  This means (A13) contradicts (A11) so therefore mC≠m*.  
Suppose mC<m*.  Then k′C(mC)-k′*(m*)>πU.  But then (A13) again contradicts (A11).  Hence, mC>m*. 
 Now consider firm j that starts selling new units in period t.  Given the sales of the firm as 
described above and competition, the present discounted value of expected profits from selling to any 
specific consumer in period t and later must equal exactly zero.  Call this value πN.  We know that 
πN+EUiC=Bi-kC(mC).  Given πN=0, we have EUiC=Bi-kC(mC) while in the benchmark case we have 
EUi*=Bi-k*(m*).  A consumer in each case will start purchasing durable units in the period he or she is 
born as long as EUiC>0 or EUi*>0 since given the pricing strategies of the firms waiting will only lower 
the present discounted value of the consumer’s net benefits (see footnote 13).  Given kC(mC)>k*(m*) by 
the fact that mC≠m*, we have vLC>vL* (while vLC<V follows immediately from V>c+mN), which in turn 
yields EUiM<(=)EUi* for all i for whom vi>(≤)vL*. 
 To complete our demonstration that there is an equilibrium that satisfies 0<vL*<vLC, mC>m*, and 
i) through vi), all we need show is that the above behavior is consistent with our initial suppositions.  
First, suppose we now allow secondhand-market trade.  Consider any pair of consumers i and j and 
suppose that all other consumers and all firms follow the strategies described above.  Clearly, there is no 
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return for consumers i and j to deviate from the strategies above by trading with each other on the 
secondhand market.  Second, we need to show that there is a value for P′, c-Δ<P′<c, that satisfies a zero-
profit condition.  Suppose P′=c.  Then, noting that c′ is arbitrarily close to c, given the above described 
behavior each firm that sells a unit for the first time earns strictly positive expected profits.  Suppose 
P′=c-Δ.  Then given the above described behavior each firm that sells a unit for the first time earns strictly 
negative expected profits.  Hence, since the expected profits associated with selling new units for the first 
time is a continuous function of P′, there must be a value for P′, c-Δ<P′<c, consistent with zero expected 
profits. 
 The final step is to argue that there does not exist an equilibrium that does not satisfy 0<vL*<vLC, 
mC>m*, and i) through vi).  Any such equilibrium would need to violate at least one condition related to 
one of the posited conditions that we started with.  One possibility is that there is never secondhand-
market trade and consumers first purchase new durable units from firms that did not sell in the past, but 
newly-born consumers who participate in the durable-goods market do not all purchase new units in their 
first period at a price P′, c-Δ<P′<c, from firms that first offer new units in that period.  First, they could 
not all purchase at a price greater than or equal to c or at a price less than or equal to c-Δ because this 
would violate the zero-profit condition.  Second, it could not be the case that in some periods newly born 
consumers purchase new units at P′ while in other periods they purchase at P#, P#≠P′.  This is because one 
of these prices would have to violate the zero-profit condition.  Third, it could not be the case that there is 
a period in which some newly-born consumers purchase at P′ while others purchase at P#, P#≠P′.  The 
reason is that the prices these consumers would face in later periods would be independent of whether the 
initial unit was purchased at P′ or P#, so all such consumers would choose the lower price.  Fourth, for 
reasons stated earlier, it could not be the case that some consumers first purchase new units after their first 
period.   
 A second possibility is that there is never secondhand-market trade, but not all consumers who 
participate in the durable-goods market first purchase from firms that did not sell new units in the past.  
The reason this is never true in equilibrium is related to arguments above.  Because of the switching cost, 
we know that firms that did not sell in the past will be willing to sell new units at a price less than c and 
earn zero expected profits on the sales.  In turn, also because of the switching cost, it cannot be optimal 
for a firm that sold in the past to match this price because it could earn strictly positive profits by charging 
a higher price and only selling to consumers who purchased from the firm in previous periods.  Finally, 
the last possibility is that there is secondhand-market trade.  Because a consumer’s value for vi does not 
affect the cost of consuming a used unit with a given maintenance requirement rather than a new unit, in 
this model there is no efficiency reason for a unit to change hands as it ages.  Combining this with the ε 
cost of trading on the secondhand market means there is no secondhand-market trade in equilibrium. 
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Proof of Proposition 2:  Pick any c′ (>c) such that V>c′+mN holds. Below, we first prove a variant of 
Proposition 2, call it Proposition 2’, in which everything is the same as in Proposition 2 except that i) and 
iii) are replaced by i)’ and iii)’ respectively, defined as follows: 
i)’ For every firm j and period t, t≥2, if firm j sold new units in the first period then Pjt1M+pjtN=P+<c+mN 
and Pjt2M+pjtN=Pjt3M+pjtN=P++Δ, while Pj11M+pj1N=P++c′-c.  Also, no firm starts production after the first 
period. 
iii)’ Each consumer i born in period t for whom vi>vLt* (vi≤vL2*) purchases a new unit and mN units of 
maintenance in period t from the same durable-goods producer (never purchases new units, used units, or 
maintenance), and each consumer i born in period 1 for whom vL2*<vi≤vL1* purchases a new unit and mN 
units of maintenance for the first time in period 2 from the same durable-goods producer, where 
vL2*=vL3*=…= vL∞*≡vL*<vL1*≡vL*+c'-c. 
The plan of the proof is as follows.  We first define the following set of strategies as Strategy Set 
M.  In this set of strategies every durable-goods producer monopolizes the maintenance market for its 
own product and includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in every period.  Also, prices are 
defined by i)’ and ii), where P+ satisfies a zero-profit condition.  In what follows we first show that the 
outcome described in Proposition 2’ is an equilibrium outcome given this set of strategies, and then show 
given this that Strategy Set M constitutes an equilibrium set of strategies. 
 Consider first consumer i who is born in period t (≥2) and does not own a used unit at the 
beginning of period t′ and did not consume a unit of any firm’s product in the previous period.  The 
consumer has two relevant options.  The consumer can purchase nothing or purchase a new unit and mN 
units of maintenance from one of the durable-goods sellers.  That is, EUiM is given by (A14). 
(A14)                                      EUiM=max{0+βEUiM,vi-P++βEi(ViU(m))} 
Let vLM be such that vLM-P++βEi(ViU(m))=0 and suppose Ei(ViU(m)) is weakly increasing in vi.  Then 
(A14) tells us that a best response for this consumer is to purchase a new unit and mN units of 
maintenance this period if vi>vLM and purchase nothing if vi≤vLM.  Further, we know that Ei(ViU(m)) must 
be weakly increasing in vi since, if it were not, there would exist an individual i who could increase 
Ei(ViU(m)) by adopting the strategy of some individual i′, vi′<vi.  This cannot be the case since it violates 
the idea that individual i’s strategy is a best response. 
 Now consider consumer i who is born in period t (≥2) and does not own a used unit at the 
beginning of period t′ but consumed a unit of firm j’s output in the previous period.  This consumer has 
three relevant options.  The consumer can purchase nothing, purchase a new unit and mN units of 
maintenance from firm j at P++Δ, or purchase a new unit and mN units of maintenance from a different 
firm at P+.  That is, Vi is given by (A15). 
(A15)                            Vi=max{0+βEUiM,vi+Δ-(P++Δ)+βEi(ViU(m)),vi-P++βEi(ViU(m))} 
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(A15) tells us that a best response for consumer i is to purchase a new unit and mN units of maintenance 
from firm j as long as vi-P++βEi(ViU(m))>βEUiM and we know this condition holds from above.  This 
implies that Vi=vi-P++βEi(ViU(m)). 
 Now consider consumer i who is born in period t (≥2) and owns a used unit of firm j’s output at 
the beginning of period t′ with maintenance realization mit′U.  This consumer has four relevant options.  
The consumer can purchase nothing, purchase mit′U units of maintenance from firm j at pjt′U(mit′U), 
purchase a new unit and mN units of maintenance from firm j at P++Δ, or purchase a new unit and mN 
units of maintenance from a different firm at P+.  That is, ViU(m) is given by (A16). 
(A16)          ViU(m)=max{0+βEUiM,vi+Δ-pjt′U(m)+βVi,vi+Δ-(P++Δ)+βEi(ViU(m)),vi-P++βEi(ViU(m))} 
Since Vi≤Ei(ViU(m)) and Vi=vi-P++βEi(ViU(m)), (A16) implies Vi=Ei(ViU(m)).  Then (A16) tells us that    
a best response for consumer i is to maintain whenever mit′U<m* and purchase a new unit and mN units of 
maintenance from firm j whenever mit′U>m*, and when mit′U=m* either behavior can be a best response 
depending on the value for pjt′U(m*).  
 To complete the first part of the proof for t≥2 all we need show is that vLM=vL* and EUiM=EUi* 
for all i.  Using notation from the proof of Proposition 1, we know that EUi*=Bi-k*(m*) for any consumer 
i for whom vi>vL* while EUi*=0 for any consumer i for whom vi≤vL*, where vL* is such that an 
individual for whom vi=vL* satisfies Bi-k*(m*)=0.  Similarly, given P+ satisfies a zero-profit condition, 
the above results tell us that EUiM=Bi-k*(m*) for any consumer i for whom vi>vLM while EUiM=0 for any 
consumer i for whom vi≤vLM, where vLM is also such that an individual for whom vi=vLM satisfies Bi-
k*(m*)=0.  We thus have vLM=vL* and EUiM=EUi* for all i.  This implies that, given Strategy Set M, the 
outcome described in Proposition 2’ is an equilibrium outcome for consumers who are born in any period 
t≥2.  Through an analogous argument, it can be shown that, given Strategy Set M, the outcome described 
in Proposition 2’ is an equilibrium outcome for consumers who are born in period 1 (details are available 
upon request). 
We now show that Strategy Set M constitutes an equilibrium set of strategies.  First, consider a 
firm in period t for whom there are individuals that consumed a unit of the firm’s product in the previous 
period and suppose that all other firms employ the strategies described in Strategy Set M.  Given the 
strategies of the other firms and assuming the consumer best responses described above, the firm cannot 
earn strictly positive profits from selling to consumers who did not consume a unit of the firm’s product 
in the previous period.  In turn, given this, the firm will achieve the highest possible profits starting in 
period t if it earns zero profits from this set of consumers and extracts all the potential surplus from the 
consumers who consumed a unit of the firm’s product in the previous period.  By the latter we mean that 
each such consumer must be indifferent between purchasing from the firm and purchasing from another 
firm in period t and all later periods and each such consumer must behave in an efficient fashion in period 
t and all later periods.  Since following the strategy described in Strategy M satisfies this given the 
consumer best responses described above, this strategy must be a best response. 
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 Second, consider a firm in period t for whom there are not individuals who consumed a unit of 
the firm’s product in the previous period, and suppose that the firm produced a strictly positive amount of 
output in a past period and that all other firms employ the strategies described in Strategy Set M.  Given 
the strategies of the other firms and assuming the consumer best responses described above, the firm 
cannot earn strictly positive profits from selling to any group of consumers this period.  In turn, given 
this, a best response is any strategy that earns zero expected profits starting in period t.  Since from above 
we know that if the firm sells new units this period it will not have an incentive to deviate from the 
strategy described in Strategy Set M in later periods, following the strategy described in Strategy Set M 
this period must be a best response. 
 Finally, consider a firm in period t for whom there are no individuals who consumed a unit of the 
firm’s product in any past period and suppose that all other firms employ the strategies described in 
Strategy Set M.  First suppose t≥2.  Since the firm did not produce a strictly positive amount of output in 
any past period, given the strategies of the other firms and assuming the consumer best responses 
described above, the firm earns strictly negative profits from selling to any group of consumers this 
period.  Next suppose t=1.  Then, given the strategies of the other firms and assuming the consumer best 
responses described above, the firm cannot earn strictly positive profits from selling a strictly positive 
amount of output this period.  In turn, given this, a best response is any strategy that earns zero expected 
profits starting in period 1.  Since from the analysis presented in the previous paragraph we know that if 
the firm sells new units this period it will not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy described in 
Strategy Set M in later periods, following the strategy described in Strategy Set M this period must be a 
best response.  Hence, Strategy Set M constitutes an equilibrium set of strategies, and in the equilibrium 
outcome no firm starts production after the first period. 
 Now pick any vi such that vi>vL2*. We can always pick c′(>c) such that vi>vL1*. This in turn 
implies that in the limit as c′ approaches c from above,  i)’ and iii)’ can be replaced by i) and iii) 
respectively in the description of the nature of the equilibrium.  Hence, in the limit as c′ approaches c 
from above, there exists an equilibrium characterized by i) through vi), where every durable-goods 
producer monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product and includes a no-trade clause in its 
sales of maintenance in every period t, t≥1.  Furthermore, it can be shown that every equilibrium exhibits 
this feature (details are available upon request). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Pick any c′ (>c) such that V>c′+s(d*)+mN holds.  Let us for now focus on a set of 
equilibria in which no firms commit to future prices.  Then, through an argument similar to the main 
argument in the proof of Proposition 2’ (which was defined in the previous proof) it can be shown that 
substituting c+s(d*) and c′+s(d*) for c and c′ respectively in i)’ of Proposition 2’, every equilibrium is 
characterized by i)’ through vi) of Proposition 2’, where in each equilibrium every durable-goods 
producer chooses durability level d*, monopolizes the maintenance market for its own product, and 
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includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in every period t, t≥1 (details are available upon 
request).  
We now show that there exists no equilibrium in which a firm commits in the first period of its 
operation to future prices and sells a strictly positive number of new units.  Suppose, to the contrary, there 
exists an equilibrium in which firm j commits in period 1 to the sequence of future prices for new units 
{pt} (t=1, 2, 3, …), and sells a positive number of new units in period 1.  Let EUk’ denote the present 
discounted value evaluated in period 1 of the expected net benefits received by consumer k who 
purchases a new unit from firm j in period 1.  We have that EUk’=EUk* must hold in the equilibrium, 
where, as in the analysis of the original model, EUi* denotes the present discounted value evaluated in the 
period the consumer is born of the expected net benefits received by consumer i in the benchmark case 
(here, in the benchmark case, the maintenance market is competitive, each producer can commit in the 
first period to the prices it will charge in subsequent periods for a new unit of output, and the level of 
product durability is fixed at d*).  To see this, consider a firm that sells a positive number of new units in 
period 1 without making a commitment to future prices.  Given the result described in the previous 
paragraph, by monopolizing the maintenance market and including a no-trade clause in its sales of 
maintenance, the firm can earn zero overall expected profits while consumer i who purchases a new unit 
from the firm in the first period receives EUi* as the present discounted value of the expected net benefits.  
Since EUi* is the maximum possible amount that consumer i can receive given the zero-profit condition, 
EUk’=EUk* must hold for firm j to sell a strictly positive number of new units in period 1. 
 In the equilibrium firm j chooses dj=d* (>0) in period 1, and in every future period consumer k 
consumes a unit produced by firm j and makes efficient replacement/maintenance decisions.  That is, if 
consumer k owns a used unit in the beginning of period t, she consumes the used unit with the required 
level of maintenance if mkt≤m* and purchases a new unit if mkt>m*, where the consumer is indifferent 
between replacement and maintenance if mkt=m*.  This implies that vk+Δ-m*+βVt+1=Vt holds for all t>1, 
where Vt denotes the value of consumer k at the beginning of period t when she does not own a used unit.   
We then have that β(Vt+1-Vt)=Vt-Vt-1 for all t (>2) where 0<β<1.  Suppose Vt+1-Vt<0, which implies that 
V
∞→tlim t=-∞.  Then consumer k switches to another firm at a certain period, and hence EUk’=EUk* cannot 
hold.  Now suppose Vt+1-Vt>0, which implies that V∞→tlim t=∞.  We then have p∞→tlim t=-∞, which violates 
pt≥0 for all t.  Therefore Vt=Vt+1≡V* holds for all t>1. 
 Note that in the equilibrium (A17) holds. 
(A17)  V1=vk-p1+β[ (v∫ *0m k+Δ-m+βV3)f(m)dm+ V∫∞*m 2f(m)dm] 
On the other hand, we have (A18) from the analysis of the benchmark case (details are available upon 
request). 
(A18)  EUk*=vk-(c′+s(d*))+β[ (v∫ *0m k+Δ-m+βV*)f(m)dm+ V*f(m)dm] ∫∞*m
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Noting that V2=V3=V* and V1=EUk*, the comparison of (A17) and (A18) yields p1=c′+s(d*) (>c′).  This 
implies that firm j can make a strictly positive profit by choosing dj=0 in period 1, which in turn implies 
that there exists no equilibrium in which a firm commits in the first period of its operation to future prices 
and sells a strictly positive number of new units. 
 Finally, an argument analogous to the one presented in the last paragraph of the proof of 
Proposition 2 completes the proof.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  In what follows we will show that there does not exist an equilibrium in which a 
firm sells a strictly positive number of new units in a certain period and does not monopolize the 
maintenance market in the next period.  Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium in which 
firm k sells a strictly positive number of new units in period t-1 and does not monopolize the maintenance 
market in period t.  Let πji(r) denote the present discounted value of firm j’s expected profits from 
consumer i who at the beginning of a period owns one of firm j’s used units that requires r units of 
replacement parts for maintenance.  Also let πji denote the present discounted value of firm j’s expected 
profits from consumer i who in the previous period consumed one of firm j’s used units.  Let PRkt denote 
the price firm k charges for a replacement part in period t, and Pkt′ denote the price at which firm k sells 
new units in period t to consumers who at the beginning of period t own one of firm k’s used units.  
Given the switching costs, in the equilibrium every consumer i who purchased a new unit from firm k in 
period t-1 consumes one of firm k’s units in every period t′, t′=t,t+1,…,∞.  Hence (A19) holds for every 
consumer i who purchased a new unit from firm k in period t-1. 
(A19)  Ei(πki(r))= [(P∫ '0r Rkt-cr)r+βπki]h(r)dr+ [(P∫∞'r kt'-c)+βEi(πki(r))]h(r)dr≡Πi  
Given rU∈(0,∞) and c+rNcr>0, in the equilibrium firm k chooses PRkt such that a strictly positive 
measure of consumers maintain their used units in period t, which implies r′>0.  Now let pjtU(r) denote the 
price that durable-goods producer j charges in period t for one unit of service and r units of replacement 
parts to individuals who own used units of the firm’s product at the beginning of period t.  Suppose that 
firm k monopolizes the maintenance market in period t, chooses pktU(r)=cs+r′PRkt for all r≤r′ and 
pktU(r)>cs+r′PRkt for all r>r′, and sells new units at the price of Pkt′ for consumers who at the beginning of 
period t own a used unit produced by firm k. Then the present discounted value evaluated in period t of 
firm k’s expected profit from each consumer i who at the beginning of period t owns one of firm k’s used 
units is given by (A20). 
(A20)  [(r′P∫ '0r Rkt-rcr)+βπki]h(r)dr+ [(P∫∞'r kt′-c)+βEi(πki(r))]h(r)dr≡Πi′ 
Given r′>0 we have (r′P∫ '0r Rkt-rcr)h(r)dr> (P∫ '0r Rkt-cr)rh(r)dr, which implies Πi′>Πi.  This implies that 
firm k is strictly better off by monopolizing the maintenance market in period t.   
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Hence there does not exist an equilibrium in which a firm sells a strictly positive number of new 
units in a certain period and does not monopolize the maintenance market in the next period.  Given this, 
through the procedure analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 (details are available upon request) it can 
be shown that in every equilibrium every durable-goods producer monopolizes the maintenance market 
for its own product and includes a no-trade clause in its sales of maintenance in every period t, t≥1.  
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